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INCREMENTAL PRICING UNDER THE NATURAL GAS
POLICY ACT OF 1978
BY CAROL CORMIE*
On April 20, 1977, President Carter unveiled to Congress and the coun-
try a national energy plan which attempted to provide a comprehensive ap-
proach to the multifarious and controversial energy issues facing the United
States. After approximately eighteen months of debate in Congress, one seg-
ment of this program was signed into law on November 9, 1978, as the Natu-
ral Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).' The ultimate form of this legislation
represented a compromise between widely divergent proposals favored by
the Administration, the House, and the Senate which were coalesced in a
conference report and narrowly approved in both the House and the Sen-
ate.2 The statute must still withstand a constitutional challenge from the
producing states.
3
It is the purpose of this paper first to attempt to analyze some of the
policy considerations leading to the enactment of the NGPA, specifically the
incremental pricing provisions contained in title II. Second, the operation
and effect of incremental pricing will be reviewed together with the role of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in implementing the
program throuagh rulemaking. Finally, an alternative scheme will be pro-
posed that has the potential to achieve the same ends as incremental pricing
by an administratively less burdensome means.
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The NGPA attempts to comply with and give effect to four national
economic policy objectives: maintenance and improvement of economic
health, reduction in unemployment, minimization of inflation, and preserva-
tion of economic equities; at the same time it attempts to achieve efficient
* Carol Cormie received her L.L.M. from Stanford University in 1979 and her L.L.B. in
Alberta, Canada.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-62 1, §§ 101- 110, 92 Stat. 3358 (1978) (hereinafter cited as NGPA).
2. The vote in the Senate was 57 to 42 and in the House of Representatives the vote was
231 to 168 with 31 abstentions.
3. The attorneys-general of Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on November 20, 1978, naming the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as defendant. Subsequently, New Mexico and
Wyoming have joined the suit and the United States as represented by the Federal Justice
Department has filed a motion to intervene in support of the FERC. It is alleged that provi-
sions of the NGPA allowing the FERC to control the price of natural gas sold by producers in
the intrastate market and compelling states to participate in implementing the statute exceed
federal authority under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution and the tenth
amendment. For discussion of similar constitutional difficulties arising from federal air and
water pollution legislation requiring state implementation, see Stewart, P ramtd of &a'nfwe?
Problems of Federa/im in Mandatoy State Implementation of National Environmental Poliy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196 (1977).
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use of energy resources. 4 Complex tradeoffs between equity and efficiency
goals are involved to balance these objectives.
In the most general sense, the NGPA provides a new scheme of controls
on wellhead prices which are paid for natural gas produced in the United
States (intrastate as well as interstate) and also provides controls on volumes
of gas imported into the United States subsequent to December 1, 1978. It
does not directly affect the regulation of the gas pipeline industry except to
the extent that certain obligations are imposed on pipeline companies in or-
der to implement the incremental pricing provisions of the NGPA. While
touted as "deregulation" of gas prices, the statute substantially complicates
both the determination of gas prices charged by producers and the distribu-
tion of the cost of gas services to consumers until 1985. Deregulation of sig-
nificant categories of "new" natural gas production will take place on
January 1, 1985, subject to Presidential or Congressional power to reinstate
controls for one eighteen month period if this appears warranted after six
months of deregulation.5 It is anticipated that by January 1, 1985, the price
of natural gas will be comparable to that of fuel oil on a Btu equivalent
basis.
Since the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court in the Philhps f6 case, the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) and its successor, the FERC,7 have been
charged with responsibility under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) 8 for regulat-
ing the prices that may be charged by natural gas producers and gatherers
for the sale in interstate commerce of gas for resale. Heretofore, the FPC's
function under the NGA had been limited largely to regulition of natural
gas pipelines that sell or transport natural gas in interstate commerce. As
indicated above, this function will continue substantially unaffected by the
NGPA. The setting by the FPC of producer prices for natural has tradition-
ally been based on a cost-of-service, "just and reasonable rates" approach
similar to that used in setting the rates of, for example, electrical utilities or
pipelines. This approach took no special account of the fact that natural gas
production is a wasting resource industry. Initially, the FPC attempted to
control producer prices on a producer-by-producer, contract-by-contract ba-
sis, but this proved impracticable. Faced with a burgeoning administrative
backlog, the FPC began to implement regional price ceilings in 19609 and in
4. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS POLICY ALTERNATIVES, H.R.
Doc. No. 31, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Dec. 1977 STAFF ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS].
5. The schedule for deregulation and provisions for reinstatement of controls are con-
tained in NGPA §§ 121-122.
6. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
7. Title IV of the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, § 401, 92 Stat.
582 (1977), authorized the creation of the FERC and the transfer to it of the authority previ-
ously administered by the FPC.
8. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976). Further, the court in Phd/:thslvery narrowly
construed the exemption from regulation of "production or gathering of natural gas" contained
in the NGA. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
9. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1967), sustaining FPC orders estab-
lishing maximum and minimum prices for producers in a large geographic area based on indus-
try-wide costs and using a double-tier rate structure for "old" and "new" gas.
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1974 switched to national maximum prices for gas of different "vintages." '
Because the FPC regulation maintained interstate gas prices at below mar-
ket levels while the intrastate gas market was outside of the FPC regulatory
jurisdiction, two separate markets developed at increasingly disparate prices.
One of the most significant departures from previous regulation under the
NGA is that ceiling prices established under the NGPA will apply to sales of
gas for resale in the intrastate market as well as interstate gas.
The NGPA defines upwards of twenty different classifications of natural
gas and then authorizes the FERC to establish maximum price ceilings pay-
able to a producer for each category. Different formulas are prescribed for
calculating the ceiling price for each category of natural gas.' I One of the
key prices is for "new natural gas,"' 2 which includes production from leases
on the Outer Continental Shelf entered into subsequent to April 20, 1977,
and from wells drilled onshore after February 19, 1977, which are sufficiently
deeper than or distant from existing wells or which penetrate new reservoirs.
Starting at a base price of $1.75 per million Btu as of April 1977, the ceiling
increases each month by the monthly equivalent of a factor equal to the sum
of the annual adjustment factor applicable for that month plus three and
one-half percent until April 1981, and four percent thereafter. This latter
increment is intended to represent the "real growth" factor in the economy.
Under this formula the ceiling price for "new gas" in January 1979, was
$2.10 per million Btu's.
The formula for "new gas" also determines the general ceiling price for
"high-cost natural gas." The ceiling price for stripper well natural gas is
determined in a similar way using a different base price, for example, $2.09
as of May 1978. Section 109 of the NGPA creates a residual formula for
setting the ceiling price of natural gas not falling within any other category,
including gas from the Prudhoe Bay Unit of Alaska. In this case, a base
price of $1.45 per million Btu's as of April 1977 increases monthly by a fac-
tor related to the annual inflation adjustment factor but without the "real
growth" component. The specific calculations of ceiling prices for all catego-
ries of natural gas are obviously complex.
Historically, the FPC and FERC rate regulations have dictated "rolled-
in" pricing whereby the pipeline blended the cost of gas acquired from all
sources pursuant to any applicable contract. This resulted in a common per
unit cost of gas to all consumers.
Title II of the NGPA creates an unprecedented scheme of "incremental
pricing" whereby all interstate pipelines will be required to maintain an "in-
cremental pricing account" to which the pipelines will credit certain por-
10. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), sustaining cost-based national
ratemaking by the FPC. Initially the maximum price of natural gas from wells commenced in
the 1973-74 biennium was set at 42 per Mcf. Effective June 21, 1974, this rate was increased to
50 per Mcf. The national rate for the 1974-75 biennium was fixed at $1.42 per Mcf, at which
time the rate for the 1975-76 biennium was increased to 93 per Mcf.
11. The specific provisions with respect to wellhead price controls are contained in subtitle
A of title I of the NGPA § 110. It is not the intention of this paper to examine these in detail.
12. NGPA § 102.
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tions of the acquistion costs of specified categories of natural gas.1 3 These
costs must be passed downstream through any intermediary pipeline or local
distributor 14 and ultimately levied as a surcharge against gas purchases by a
"non-exempt" industrial user until such user is paying a price for gas
equivalent to the alternative fuel oil cost on a Btu basis. This will then be-
come a ceiling price to that user until every incrementally priced customer
served by that interstate pipeline is paying its "alternative fuel cost" for gas.
The allocation of credits to the incremental pricing account beyond this
point appears to be in dispute. The FERC staff task force established to
study and propose rulemaking in respect to incremental pricing mechanisms
has advocated that all consumers other than incrementally priced industrial
users should pay these "excess costs" until parity is reached with the price of
gas to incrementally priced consumers. 15 The Interstate Natural Gas Associ-
ation of America has urged that costs be spread among all consumers includ-
ing residential, commercial, and incrementally priced industrial users.
16
Another proposal, from the United Distribution Companies, is to "accrue"
these costs in the incremental pricing account until recovery is possible from
incrementally priced users who become capable of further surcharge absorp-
tion as fuel oil prices increase.
1 7
The NGA will continue to govern pricing of "old" gas in interstate com-
merce although the NGPA authorizes the FERC to amend ceiling prices for
sales of gas previously dedicated to interstate commerce and provides a mini-
mal escalation of "old gas" prices in accordance with the annual inflation
adjustment factor.' 8 "Old gas" presently subject to intrastate contracts will
be regulated under the NGPA only to the extent that contractual prices may
be increased up to but not exceeding the "new gas" price.' 9
The underlying philosophy of the NGPA is that higher incentive prices
are required to encourage exploration for, development of, and production
from domestic natural gas reserves critically needed to reduce dependence
on foreign oil imports. At least since 1960, regulation by the FPC and the
FERC has suppressed the price of natural gas relative to other fuel sources
thereby discouraging new discoveries and encouraging gas consumption by
low priority users.
2 0
13. While incremental pricing has no real counterpart under the Natural Gas Act, analo-
gies can be drawn to emergency purchases and "purchased gas adjustment" clauses.
14. NGPA § 205 prohibits a local distributor from offsetting the surcharge to nonexempt
industrial users through modifications in allocation of costs or any other procedure. Further-
more, title II preempts any state or local law that might have the effect of precluding the pass-
through of the surcharge or otherwise defeating the intention of the NGPA.
15. Staff Task Force Proposal for Regulations to Implement Incremental Pricing, FERC
DOCKET No. RM 79-14 at 25, attachment A (1979).
16. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 12, 1979, at I and 2 and Mar. 12, 1979, at 2.
17. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 2.
18. NGPA § 104.
19. The NGPA § 105 provides that where contract prices under existing intrastate con-
tracts are below the price for "new natural gas," the contract price will prevail, subject to esca-
lation expressly provided for in the contract up to a level equivalent to the "new gas" price.
Where prices under intrastate contracts exceed the new gas price in effect as of November 9,
1978, the price will be fixed as at that date, subject to increases for the inflation factor. In other
words, further escalation clauses contained in the contract would not be enforceable.
20. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., THE ECONOMICS
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Much of the economic analysis of the NGPA has focused on price elas-
ticity of supply of natural gas. Congressional staff members concluded from
the diminishing ratio of annual additions of proven reserves to annual pro-
duction over the past ten to twelve years that, despite progressively higher
gas prices, long-run supply elasticity of gas is substantially less than 1.0.21
The natural gas industry appears to be of the opinion that domestic natural
gas resources have not been exhausted and that increased gas supplies would
be forthcoming if producers were free from price regulation. 22 While a three
to five year lead time is normally allowed for a program of exploration and
development, it is anticipated that a temporary surplus of "bubble gas" will
come on the market almost immediately.
23
Regulation of gas prices under the NGA failed to take into account the
variable risks and hence variable costs of producing gas from different types
of wells, for example, a high-risk wildcat well as opposed to a development
well. Without an adequate price incentive for new discoveries, producers
have tended to drill fewer exploratory wells and therefore most new proven
reserves have been extensions of existing reservoirs. The aim of the NGPA is
to offer the greatest price incentive to those types of production having the
highest supply elasticity. For example, "high-cost gas",24 produced under
conditions of extraordinary risk or cost will be deregulated as to the price on
the date of the FERC incremental pricing rules go into effect, which must be
no later than November 9, 1979. Assuming that this incentive scheme is
successful, money that would otherwise have been paid to foreign energy
sources will now be channelled to domestic producers. Secondary benefits
should be realized in the form of stimulation of the economy, increased em-
ployment, improvement in the balance of payments position, and strength-
ening of the American dollar.
In addition to the general gas supply problem, interstate pipelines have
suffered particular supply failures. Under the "vintage" pricing regime, con-
siderable incentive has existed for producers to withhold production from
OF THE NATURAL GAS CONTROVERSY, JOINT COMM. No. 9080, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (Sept.
1977) [hereinafter cited as the Sept. 1977 STAFF STUDY].
21. Dec. 1977 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 10.
22. See Blinn, The Natural Gas Stuation-What Are the Prospects, 23 ANNUAL INST. MIN. L. 31
(1976); Funkhouser, Ultradeep Gas Exploration-An Expanding Frontlir, 16 EXPLORATION AND
ECON. OF PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 103 (1978); Wilson,
The Pohics of Energy, 16 EXPLORATION AND ECON. OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 273 (1978); Mahlein, Domestic and International Repercussions of the
National Energ Plan, 16 EXPLORATION AND ECON. OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 259 (1978).
23. There has been considerable controversy over the significance of this bubble gas in
both extent and duration. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 1.
24. NGPA § 107 defines "High-Cost Natural Gas" to include the following:
(a) production from a well drilled subsequent to February 19, 1977, with a comple-
tion location in excess of 15,000 feet;
(b) gas produced from geopressurized brine;
(c) occluded natural gas produced from coal seams;
(d) gas produced from Devonshire shale;
(e) gas produced under such other circumstances as the FERC determines to present
extraordinary risks or costs.




interstate commerce in anticipation of higher future prices. Furthermore,
production has been diverted to the higher priced intrastate market when-
ever possible. With increasing frequency, interstate pipelines have had to
impose curtailment measures against their industrial customers 25 and ar-
range for short-term emergency gas purchases from producers, intrastate
pipelines, or local distribution companies at "unregulated" prices.
26 An an-
cillary problem has been the economic dislocation caused by industry mi-
grating to the "southern rim" producing states in order to obtain a more
secure supply of gas from intrastate pipelines despite higher prices.
27
It is anticipated that the establishment of a uniform price for new gas in
both the intrastate and interstate markets will enable interstate pipelines to
compete more effectively with intrastate pipelines for new supplies.
Futhermore, because the average price of "old" interstate gas is approxi-
mately $0.60 per million Btu's compared with $1.30 per million Btu for in-
trastate gas,28 the interstate pipelines can roll in higher volumes of the more
expensive "new gas" and still maintain a lower blended price. This could
provide interstate pipelines with a competitive advantage over intrastate
pipelines, allowing them to increase their market share. In any event, estab-
lishing a definite price path for gas until deregulation should facilitate long
range planning and financing by producers and also alleviate the problem of
withholding production until prices are higher.
Congressional economic advisers postulated that to completely deregu-
late gas prices at this time would cause massive inflation without any sub-
stantial gains in supply.29 A pipeline company is less concerned about the
price it is paying to the producer than about the security of supply needed to
maintain its customers because its profits are based upon the volume of gas
carried. Particularly in the initial stages of deregulation the price of new gas
could be driven above its Btu equivalent price in relation to oil since this
higher cost "new gas" (a small percentage of total gas volumes) could still be
sold at a price lower than fuel oil on a Btu equivalent basis when blended
with low-cost "old gas." It is feared that rapidly rising prices would cause
marginal industrial gas users to convert to alternative fuel sources, leaving
the residential and small commercial customer to finance a disproportion-
ately large burden of the fixed costs of gas service as well as paying for the
higher priced gas.
The incremental pricing provisions contained in title II of the NGPA
are designed to shield the residential and small commercial consumer of gas
25. See Harrison & Formby, Regzonal Distortions in Natural Gas Allocations, 57 N.C.L. REV. 47
(1978).
26. The price of such emergency purchases was regulated to the extent that the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976), required the President of the United States to authorize emer-
gency purchases by interstate pipelines on terms and conditions (including price) which he de-
termined to be "appropriate."
27. A. WILLIAMS, C. MEYERS & F. MAXWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS 58 (4th ed. 1979).
28. STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER, COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF H.R. 5289 (NGPA of 1978). H.R. Doc. No.
62, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
29. Id. at 5.
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from the increased wellhead prices allowed under the statute, at least in the
short run.' ° A second objective of incremental pricing is to achieve a more
efficient allocation of resources by shifting the burden of new higher priced
gas onto low priority users up to the point where they are paying a price that
equates natural gas to its Btu equivalent in fuel oil. Although scarce, natural
gas has unique properties that make it a particularly superior fuel for pur-
poses such as domestic cooking, water heating, and space heating. 3 1 How-
ever, at the prices that have prevailed under the FPC and FERC legislation,
industry has drawn heavily on supplies of this resource rather than using
relatively higher priced but abundant fuels such as coal. 32 From time to
time the FPC has attempted to exercise a general allocation and conserva-
tion function with respect to natural gas, but its effectiveness has largely
been thwarted by lack of jurisdiction over intrastate sales.3 3 As of Septem-
ber 1977, it was estimated that seven Tcf of natural gas were sold annually to
industrial users,34 and as of October 1978, it was estimated that approxi-
mately ten percent of interstate demand (1. 1-1.2 Tcf annually) consisted of
industrial users of gas as boiler fuel. 35 This latter group will be affected most
seriously and immediately by the incremental pricing provisions of the
NGPA.
II. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF INCREMENTAL PRICINC-
RULEMAKING UNDER THE NGPA
A. Substantive Rulemaking
The NCPA does not specifically prescribe incremental pricing. Instead,
the recent enactment of section 4(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act 36 directs the FERC to prescribe and make effective an incremental pric-
30. It is estimated that prices will increase to residential consumers under NGPA at ap-
proximately the same rate as without it, and may in fact be less to consumers supplied from the
intrastate market, until 1983 when industrial users are expected to reach their threshold of fuel
equivalent price. Thereafter, prices to residential consumers can be expected to rise more
steeply. Id. at 13.
31. See dissenting opinion of Jackson, J. in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944).
32. This raises a vivid example of competing interests in national energy policy. With the
advent of stationary source emissions standards and ambient air quality standards established
by the EPA, there has been further demand for gas as a clean and efficient fuel. At the same
time, government is enforcing coal conversion under the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 45
U.S.C.A.). Meanwhile, then Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger is quoted as saying, "we
wish to burn all the gas that we can in the short run to hold down oil imports." Wall Street J.,
Nov. 16, 1978, at 2, Col. 3 (Western ed.).
33. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 385 U.S. 1 (1961) (the Supreme
Court ultimately sustained the refusal by the FPC to issue a certificate of public convenience
and necessity required by Consolidated Edison Co. to transport gas reserves from Texas for use
as boiler fuel in New York City). See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (the court dismissed petitions for review of Order No. 467 issued by the FPC January 8,
1973, establishing a "Statement of Policy" on priorities of deliveries by jurisdictional pipelines
during periods of curtailment. This policy was designed to ensure that during periods of
shortage of supply there would be full curtailment of all industrial users before any curtailment
to residential or small commercial customers).
34. Sept. 1977 STAFF STUDY, szepra note 20, at 86.
35. 1978 STAFF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 28, at 16.
36. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (1976). In this
1979]
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ing rule; >e., a rule designed to provide for the pass through to certain ulti-
mate consumers of certain costs incurred by pipelines in purchasing natural
gas. The statute specifies in some detail how the incremental pricing pro-
gram is to function and therefore what the FERC must include in its initial
rule and any subsequent amendments. Nevertheless, the FERC has been
granted considerable latitude and inevitably will make important policy
choices.
Rulemaking pursuant to title II of the NGPA can be roughly classified
into four areas: determination of who will be subject to incremental pricing,
what costs will be incrementally priced, what will be the "alternative fuel
cost" to incrementally priced consumers, and what mechanical and account-
ing procedures must be adopted in order to implement the scheme.
(1) Who is subject to incremental pricing?
Section 201 of the NGPA requires that no later than November 9, 1979,
the FERC will prescribe and begin to enforce a rule providing for pass-
through of incremental costs to consumers of gas for industrial boiler fuel use
who are serviced by interstate pipelines. No later than May 9, 1980, an
amendment to this rule must be proposed pursuant to section 202 to extend
the application of incremental pricing to a wider class of industrial consum-
ers. In anticipation of the controversy surrounding this exercise of discre-
tion, the NGPA expressly provides that both the House and the Senate must
review such amendment and either congressional body may adopt a "resolu-
tion of disapproval" rejecting the amendment. 37 Obviously, this is a politi-
cally sensitive issue since the residential consumer will feel the effect of
higher gas prices more slowly if the incremental pricing net is cast more
widely.
The discretion of the FERC in such rulemaking is constrained by statu-
torily mandated exemptions from incremental pricing. However, the nature
of the exemptions portends onerous case-by-case decisionmaking on the part
of the FERC. 38 Exemptions are to be granted in two stages: an interim
exemption applicable for a six-month period from November 9, 1979, and a
permanent exemption to be promulgated not later than eighteen months
from enactment of the NGPA. Exemptions are to be granted to the follow-
ing consumer groups:
(a) Small industrial-An interim exemption must be granted to
statute the President of the United States was required to promulgate a rule providing for allo-
cation of petroleum and petroleum products in emergency situations.
37. NGPA § 202(c).
38. The procedure proposed by the FERC Staff Task Force with respect to granting ex-
emptions is to require all suppliers to identify from their delivery records prior to October 1,
1979, all end-use customers who qualify for the small industrial facility exemption. The remain-
ing customers would receive exemption forms from their supplier no later than October 1, 1979,
to be completed and returned no later than October 20, 1979. If a responsible officer of such
end-user swears under oath that facts exist qualifying the facility for exemption, that customer
will be exempt from incremental pricing. No later than November 15, 1979, each supplier will
be required to confirm to its customers whether or not it has qualified for exemption. Critics of
the Task Force proposal would like to see exemptions determined at an earlier date to avoid
compliance costs to groups who will ultimately be exempt from incremental pricing.
[Vol. 57:1
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industrial boiler fuel users in existence on November 9, 1978,
consuming on average less than 300 mcf of gas per day. 39 The
permanent exemption rule is potentially more restrictive and
will apply to small industrial boiler fuel facilities whose aver-
age daily consumption during a peak month of 1977 did not
exceed either 300 mcf or such lower amount as the FERC
may determine as a maximum rate of consumption (total vol-
ume of gas consumption by facilities eligible for this exemp-
tion is not to exceed five percent of the total volume of gas
transmitted by the interstate pipelines and used as boiler fuel
in 1977).40
(b) Agricultural-A facility will be exempt from incremental
pricing in the interim period to the extent that its consump-
tion of natural gas is for an "agricultural use," which includes
strictly agricultural purposes such as irrigation pumping and
crop drying and also industrial uses such as those utilized in
food processing and in production of fertilizer, agricultural
chemicals, and animal feed. 4 1 The permanent rule must ex-
empt agricultural users from incremental pricing in all cases
where an alternative fuel is neither "economically practica-
ble" nor "reasonably available."
'42
(c) Schools, hospitals and other similar institutions.
43
(d) Any electrical utility.
44
(e) Any qualifying cogenerator to the extent provided by FERC
rules.
45
(f Any other incrementally priced facility or category thereof
designated by FERC rules, subject to the right of either the
House or the Senate to pass a resolution of disapproval within
thirty days.46 Under this provision the FERC has discretion
to exempt "in whole or in part" and therefore would appear to
have authority to establish variable levels of incremental pric-
ing for specified industrial consumers.
(2) Costs to be incrementally priced.
The costs that are to be passed through to non-exempt industrial users
39. NGPA § 206(a)(1).
40. NGPA § 206(a)(2).
41. NGPA § 206(a)(3). In the proposed rulemaking by the FERC StaffTask Force, "agri-
cultural use" has been defined as any use of natural gas which is certified by the Secretary of
Agriculture as an "essential agricultural use" qualifying for exemption from curtailment under
NGPA § 401. This is an exceedingly broad category essentially including every agricultural use
necessary for "full food and fiber production."
42. NGPA § 206(b)(2).
43. NGPA § 206(c)(1). This wording has been criticized as creating "an open-ended area
of confusion" in effect encouraging "all sorts of people to claim they are in a similar use." Inside
FERC (McGraw-Hill), Feb. 19, 1979, at 11.
44. NGPA § 206(c)(2).
45. NGPA § 206(c)(3). The cogenerator must meet the definitional requirements pre-
scribed in the Federal Power Act § 3(18)(B), as amended by the Public Utility Regulatory Poli-
cies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828c (1974 & Supp. 1978). Essentially a cogenerator is an
electric power plant or major fuel-burning facility which produces electric power and some
other form of useful energy (steam, gas, heat) to be used for industrial, commercial or other
space heating purposes.
46. NGPA § 206(d).
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served by an interstate pipeline are the following acquisition costs of natural
gas incurred by such pipelines subsequent to January 1, 1980 and calculated
in accordance with section 203:
(a) An interstate pipeline must include in its incremental pricing
account the amount by which such pipeline's "first sale ac-
quistion costs" for certain categories of natural gas exceed the
"incremental pricing threshold" applicable for the month in
which delivery of the gas occurs. "First sale acquisition costs"
are defined as the price paid per million Btu in the first sale of
natural gas (exclusive of any amount of state severance tax)
with respect to domestic gas production and the price paid
per million Btu at point of entry in the case of natural gas or
liquified natural gas imported into the United States.47 The
"incremental pricing threshold" is a monthly calculation
based on $1.48 per million Btu as of March 1978, afterwards
adjusted for inflation.48 The categories of natural gas whose
costs are subject to this scheme of incremental pricing are the
following:
(i) New natural gas-includes gas (other than
Prudhoe Bay Unit gas from Alaska) produced
from a new lease on the Outer Continental Shelf" 9
or from any new onshore well 50 more than two and
one-half miles from a marker well5 ' or deeper than
any marker well within a two and one-half mile
radius by more than 1000 feet, or from a new reser-
voir which had no commercial production of natu-
ral gas prior to April 1977.52
(ii) Natural gas under'intrastate rollover contract-in-
cludes gas sold under a contract renegotiated sub-
sequent to enactment of the NGPA that was not
previously dedicated to interstate commerce.
53
(iii) New onshore production well gas-includes gas
(other than Prudhoe Bay Unit gas) from an on-
shore well in which surface drilling began on or af-
ter February 19, 1977, and which essentially
represents production from a reservoir having had
no previous commercial production.
54
47. NGPA § 203(b)(1). The FERC also has power under NGPA § 203(b)(2) to prescribe
rules for determining proper "first sale acquisition costs" with respect to gas produced by any
interstate pipeline or its affiliate.
48. NGPA § 203(c). The "Annual Inflation Adjustment Factor" is defined in NGPA
§ 101(a).
49. NGPA § 2(9) defines a "New Lease" to include a lease of submerged acreage entered
into on or after April 20, 1977.
50. NGPA § 2(3) defines a "New Well" to include a well the surface drilling of which
began after February 19, 1977, or which was recompleted after that date at a depth at least
1000 feet below its previous completion location.
51. NGPA § 2(5) defines a "Marker Well" to include a well from which natural gas was
produced in commercial quantities at any time between January 1, 1970, and April 20, 1977,
excepting certain "new wells" that might otherwise also fall within this definition.
52. NGPA § 102(c).
53. NGPA § 2(12).
54. NGPA § 103(c).
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(iv) Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports55 _-subject to a
general rule that incremental pricing will not apply
to LNG where importation was authorized or an
application to import was pending prior to May 1,
1978. However, the right has been reserved to the
FERC or the Secretary of the Department of En-
ergy (DOE) to impose incremental pricing in the
granting of an import permit for LNG under the
NGA.
56
(v) Sales of gas from an intrastate pipeline to interstate
pipeline or any local distribution company served
by an interstate pipeline-subject to the authoriza-
tion of the FERC in accordance with section 311 (b)
of the NGPA.
57
(b) To the extent that the volume of imported natural gas
(other than LNG) exceeds the maximum delivery obli-
gations under a contract entered into prior to May 1,
1978, and exceeds the volume of gas delivered under
that contract for the comparable period in 1977,58 its
first sale acquisition cost in excess of the "new gas" price
will be included in the incremental pricing account.
59
The FERC or the Secretary of the DOE has the right to
impose incremental pricing as a condition to granting
any import permit for natural gas with respect to
volumes in excess of 1977 deliveries. 60
(c) First sale acquisition costs of non-associated natural gas
from a stripper well that are in excess of the "new gas"
price will be included in the incremental pricing ac-
count. A stripper well is one that produces no more than
sixty mcf per day at its maximum efficient rate of flow.
6 '
(d) First sale acquisition costs for "high-cost" gas in excess of
130 percent of what is determined by the FERC
monthly to be the equivalent Btu cost of No. 2 fuel oil
landed in New York will also be included in the incre-
mental pricing account.
62
(e) Two types of costs may be incrementally priced with re-
spect to Prudhoe Bay Unit gas transported through the
natural gas transportation system approved under the
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976.63 One
of these is first sale acquisition cost exceeding the maxi-
mum lawful price computed under section 10 9 .
61 The
55. NGPA § 207.
56. NGPA §§ 207(a), (c).
57. NGPA § 203(a)(10).
58. NGPA § 207(b).
59. NGPA § 203(a)(5).
60. NGPA § 207(c).
61. NGPA § 203(a)(6).
62. NGPA § 203(a)(7). For definition of high-cost gas, see supra note 24.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 719 (1979).
64. NGPA § 109 provides a ceiling price for residual categories of natural gas not included
within any other section of subtitle I, and specifically covers natural gas produced from the
Prudhoe Bay Unit of Alaska. As a general rule, this price has been set at $1.45 per million Btu
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other is any amount paid other than to the producer for
costs of gathering, processing, treating, liquifying, trans-
porting, or compressing such gas prior to its delivery into
the system.
65
(f) One further cost that is to pass through to non-exempt
industrial consumers under the incremental pricing
scheme is any increase in state severance tax above the
level in force on December 1, 1977, unless such increase
results from a change in the method of computing the tax
meeting certain statutory criteria.66 However, the pre-
December 1977 base amount of such tax will be shared
by all consumers.
As is obvious from the above discussion, one of the most complicated
and potentially controversial aspects of implementation of the NGPA will be
the certification of each source of production as belonging to one of the cate-
gories defined in the statute. Categorization has a threefold impact: it deter-
mines the maximum price to which the producer is entitled; it determines
whether any part of that acquisition price will be subject to incremental
pricing, and, if so, the formula to be applied in determining the amount to
be included in the incremental pricing account; and it determines when, if
ever, the price of that production will be deregulated. It is further apparent
that in some circumstances a well could meet the requirements of more than
one category. The FERC is required to establish a rule for classifying gas in
order to calculate the pass-through of acquistion costs based upon the classi-
fication for pricing purposes in title I. Where natural gas would qualify for
inclusion in more than one pricing category, it must be classified within the
category yielding the highest price.6 7 Under most circumstances this will
work to the advantage of the producer. However, because of the various
dates for deregulation of different categories of gas and the various ways
pass-through portions of acquisition costs are calculated, it could be in the
best interests of the producer to seek a lower-priced classification in the short
run in anticipation of greater long-term revenue and increased marketabil-
ity.
Much of the technical information required to properly classify the dif-
ferent types of natural gas production must come from the various state
agencies responsible for regulating the actual drilling and operations of the
as of April, 1977, adjusted monthly thereafter for inflation. However, NGPA § 109(b)(2) pro-
vides that the FERC may increase the maximum lawful ceiling price applicable to the first sale
of any category of natural gas ordinarily subject to this section, provided that such price is "just
and reasonable" within the meaning of the NGA. Hence the seemingly incongruous wording of
NGPA § 203(a)(8)(A) that first sale acquisition costs of Alaska natural gas exceeding the maxi-
mum lawful price (insofar as NGPA § 109 sets a ceiling price for other categories of natural gas)
shall be included in the incremental pricing account.
65. NGPA § 203(a)(8)(B). It is significant to note that actual transportation costs within
the proposed new pipeline will be rolled-in to the price of the Alaska natural gas. This was
deemed necessary in order to attract the vast sums of private investment capital sought in con-
nection with construction of the pipeline.
66. NGPA § 203(a)(9).




producers.68 In many instances the records of these agencies are inadequate
and can't provide the information required by the NGPA with respect to
matters such as well completion depth and volume of production. 69 Techni-
cal engineering expertise will be required to assess whether a well drains a
new reservoir from which there has been no previous commercial produc-
tion. There is considerable room for honest differences of expert opinion on
these questions. A further problem will be the resistance anticipated from
state agencies regarding the additional workload and expense imposed by
this federal statute.
(3) Determination of alternative fuel cost.
Another key rulemaking function delegated to the FERC is determina-
tion of "alternative fuel cost," a critical fulcrum on which incremental pric-
ing is balanced. Each non-exempt industrial gas user will be subjected to
incremental pricing until its cost for gas reaches its alternative fuel cost.
This then becomes a ceiling for that user, at least until all customers of the
interstate pipeline supplying the gas have reached their respective alterna-
tive fuel cost.
The NGPA provides as a general rule that the FERC will designate
regions throughout the country. Within each of these regions the alternative
fuel cost will be the price per million Btu paid for No. 2 fuel oil by industrial
users of such fuel in that region.7° However, to alleviate the risk of rapid
conversion of industrial gas users from gas to other fields by applying this
broad standard, the FERC is authorized to reduce the "alternative fuel cost"
for any category of incrementally-priced industrial user or individual facility
within a region to a level not lower than the price per million Btu of No. 6
fuel oil in that region. In deciding whether an alternative fuel cost should be
reduced the FERC must satisfy itself, after an appropriate investigation and
hearing, that such conversion is "likely to occur" if the appropriate alterna-
tive fuel cost is not reduced and that rates and charges to high-priority gas
users would be increased if conversion took place.
7 1
The FERC is not empowered to consider the relative cost of coal as a
potential alternative fuel source in setting the threshold for incremental pric-
68. NGPA § 503 prescribes the procedure for classifying categories of natural gas. In gen-
eral, the federal (e.g., USGS) or state agency having regulatory jurisdiction in respect to the
production of natural gas will have authority to make such determination based upon the appli-
cation filed by a producer with respect to each well. These findings are then reported to the
FERC which has 45 days in which to review and take action thereon or the determination will
be conclusive. The FERC may issue a "preliminary finding" in doubtful circumstances which
allows them a further 120 days to investigate the producer's claim. Applications made by pro-
ducers prior to March 1, 1979, will qualify for the higher gas prices retroactive to December 1,
1978; subsequent to that date the higher price is applicable only from the actual date of receipt
of the application. This has placed an inordinate assessment burden on the reviewing agencies
in the early stages of the legislation.
69. Stuart, A Bad Start on Gas Deregulatton, FORTUNE, Feb. 12, 1979, at 87.
70. NGPA § 204(e)(1).
71. NGPA § 204(e)(2). Where conversion to coal is mandatory under the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 42, 45 U.S.C.A.,) a category-wide reduction in "alternative fuel cost" is not appropriate
since such conversions are unrelated to the level of incremental pricing of gas.
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ing. It is anticipated that if gas prices rise to a Btu equivalent of No. 6 fuel
oil there will be massive conversion to coal in the Rocky Mountain states
where coal is readily available resulting in load-shifting to high-priority gas
users. It would seem that Congress either was not concerned with or did not
appreciate fully the impact of increased gas prices upon residential and com-
mercial users brought about by industrial users converting from gas to coal.
The principal preoccupation has been to minimize dependence on oil. The
extent to which high-priority users should bear the cost of gas and gas service
raises squarely the conflict between efficiency and equity considerations. On
the one hand, a more efficient resource allocation should result if cost savings
can be realized by industry through conversion to coal once gas has been
priced at its true Btu value. On the other hand, it may be thought that load-
shifting creates an undue hardship on residential and commercial consum-
ers, a situation made more an anathema because of the regional basis on
which conversion to coal is likely to occur, e.g., within the western states
where enormous reserves of low-sulphur coal are readily accessible.
In calculating the "alternative fuel cost," no consideration is given to
the captial and operating costs of conversion. Unless there were full substi-
tutibility of fuels within an existing plant, it would be rational for facilities to
resist incurring costs of conversion where the marginal cost of the fuel itself
was equal. Theoretically, this will achieve the optimal outcome of a facility
paying the full Btu value of the gas without converting to oil. However,
other factors such as the long run security of supply and the environmental
considerations will also be critical to management in making the decision to
convert.
There is an obvious incentive for almost every incrementally-priced in-
dustrial gas user to apply either to be exempted completely from the scheme
or to have its alternative fuel cost reduced. 72 The administrative costs of this
rulemaking process could be formidable. In addition, there is a com-
pounding effect because as some industrial users are exempted or have their
alternative fuel cost reduced, incremental pricing will be accelerated for
others.
(4) Accounting procedures and other mechanics of implementation.
It is inevitable that the metering, accounting, reporting, and filing func-
tions imposed on the pipeline industry as a result of incremental pricing will
be onerous. The greatest challenge to rulemaking in this area may be to try
72. See supra note 46, and accompanying text. Utah and Wyoming have already indicated
their intention to apply for state-wide exemptions from incremental pricing, alleging that it is
"inappropriate" where the alternative fuel to gas is coal. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill), Feb. 19,
1979, at 1. California has also proposed that a state should be exempted when it can certify that
gas prices are already equal to the designated alternative fuel. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill)
Mar. 12, 1979, at 7. One proposal put forward by an FERC staff adviser is to have incre-
mentally-priced users self-certify their alternative fuel cost; ge., each facility would indicate
whether No. 2 or No. 6 fuel oil represented its alternative fuel cost with the understanding that
if the selection was made for the fuel oil which resulted in a higher incremental pricing burden,
the facility would have higher priority in respect to curtailment. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill)
Apr. 9, 1979, at 5, 6.
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to minimize the administrative paperwork. 73
The supplier who is farthest downstream must maintain records respect-
ing each of its non-exempt customers in regard to volumes of gas delivered;
this includes distinguishing between volumes of gas used for exempt and
non-exempt purposes by any given customer 74 and the alternative fuel cost
of each. Accounts must be kept of costs to be incrementally priced including
surcharges imposed by upstream suppliers and carrying charges. Calcula-
tions must be made with respect to surcharges to be imposed on each non-
exempt user based upon the volume of gas consumed by that user in relation
to all gas consumed by non-exempt users who are serviced by that supplier
and subject to each user's alternative fuel cost ceiling. Accounts must be
maintained with respect to collection of such surcharges and information
must be passed upstream as to capacity to levy a surcharge as customers
reach their respective alternative fuel cost.
75
Corresponding accounts must be maintained by each of the upstream
suppliers in the chain in order that the scheme can be maintained in dy-
namic equilibrium. Obviously the system becomes increasingly complex as
the number of carriers between producer and consumer increases. In addi-
tion, the FERC will undoubtedly prescribe rules requiring filing of tariff
sheets and detailed computations of surcharges together with other informa-
tion that the FERC and Energy Information Administration (EIA) believe
to be necessary to monitor the incremental pricing program.
One of the critical aspects of implementation will be timing. Under the
NGPA, the FERC was effectively allowed one year to make incremental
pricing operational. Given the extensive rulemaking required, this imposes a
considerable time constraint and encourages the FERC to incorporate in its
rules provisions for deferment of certain calculations as statutorily allowed. 76
The FERC is authorized to provide by rule that the surcharge applicable for
volumes of gas delivered in one calender period can be levied and collected
in the next year.77 Presumably this would have the advantage of allowing
time for the accounting function to be performed with some degree of accu-
racy rather than making an initial calculation which might later require re-
visions and rebates. The problem, however, is how long these costs can be
73. The FERC is requesting 300 new staff members at a cost of I I million per year to
alleviate the start-up workload anticipated as a result of passage of the NGPA. Supra note 69, at
88.
74. The FERC Task Force proposal for rulemaking has been criticized for failing to deal
with the costs of metering gas volumes. "Sub-metering" devices would have to be installed in
those industrial facilities consuming gas for both exempt and non-exempt use. It is argued by
industrial users that these costs should be borne by gas customers who are essentially being
subsidized by the incrementally-priced consumers, or at least should be included in calculating
the cost of the gas service in relation to its achieving a price level equivalent to alternative fuel
cost. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 11.
75. NGPA §§ 201-202.
76. NGPA § 204(c)(3)(A).
77. The FERC Task Force proposal provides that incremental costs incurred within a six
month period ending December 31st and June 30th would be billed to users in six equal
monthly installments commencing on the following May 1st and November 1st. This inordi-
nate time lag and the concomitant carrying charges have been seriously criticized by the indus-
try. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 10.
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The FERC is directed by the NGPA to observe the customary rulemak-
ing procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 including the usual
notice provisions and opportunity for comment by interested persons. The
FERC has approached its rulemaking obligations under title II of the NGPA
by segmenting them into two categories, one the designation of alternative
fuel cost regions and the pegging of an alternative fuel cost for each region
and the other all residual matters requiring rulemaking. A separate task
force has been assigned to analyze the issues and draft proposed rules in each
area. A sixteen part questionnaire was sent by the EIA to interstate pipe-
lines, local distributors, state commissions, and other interested persons in an
attempt to compile the data base necessary to draft rules relating to alterna-
tive fuel costs. 80 Written and oral public comments on this issue are also
solicited through regional meetings.
With respect to other rulemaking responsibilities, the FERC issued a
Notice of Informal Public Conference and Inquiry on January 12, 1979,8'
containing the recommendations of its staff task force together with some
proposed alternatives. Written comments on the proposed rules were solic-
ited for a thirty-day period8 2 and an informal public conference to provide a
forum for oral presentations followed. Other regional meetings were sched-
uled to address particular problem areas such as accounting mechanics and
state implementation schemes.
After consideration of these informal comments, the task force amended
its original proposal and circulated the revised draft notice of proposed
rulemaking to the FERC. After meeting on the proposal, the FERC issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in accordance with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The FERC then subjected the rules to public scrutiny 3 once
again because section 502(b) of the NGPA expressed Congress' intention
78. Northern Natural Gas Co. estimated that its deferred costs under incremental pricing
would be $47 million by the end of June, 1980 and $180 million after three years, with carrying
charges of $680,000 per month to support this debt. To meet these cash-flow difficulties suppli-
ers argue that they will be required to arrange short-term financing at interest rates in excess of
the carrying charges. Id
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
80. Industry has resisted supplying the information requested, alleging that if answered the
form would lead to "unwarranted conclusions" about potential for fuel substitution. The form
has also been criticized for lacking the refinement necessary to distinguish among different fuels
that can be used for some but not all of an industry's activities and to distinguish between the
substitutability of fuels and the conversion to a completely new system. Inside FERC (Mc-
Graw-Hill) Feb. 5, 1979, at 11-12.
81. Staff Task Force Proposal for Regulations to Implement Incremental Pricing, supra
note 15.
82. This deadline was later extended to allow time for evaluation of new methodologies
advanced by industry representatives. Inside FERO (McGraw-Hill) Feb. 19, 1979, at 10.
83. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976) exempts from notice and
public hearing procedures, interpretive rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure of practice, and situations where the agency makes a well-reasoned find-
ing that such procedures are impraticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
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that, to the maximum extent practicable, an opportunity for oral presenta-
tion of data and arguments should be afforded prior to the effective date of
any rule.8 4 The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning alternative fuel
cost was issued May 18, 1979, and was followed by four to six weeks of re-
gional hearings. Redrafting and recommendations by the FERC are neces-
sary before the final rule is issued. 85 The procedure for rulemaking on the
incremental pricing mechanism will follow the same pattern.
8 6
The FERC must provide by rule a procedure whereby anyone claiming
"special hardship, inequity or an unfair distribution of burdens" by reason
of the substantive rules can apply for an "interpretation, modification, or
rescission of, exception to, or exemption from" such rules.
8 7 If the FERC
rejects such a request for adjustment, an aggrieved party is entitled to seek
judicial review in accordance with section 506 of the NGPA.
It is significant to note that Congress delegated extensive decisionmak-
ing power to the FERC under title II of the NGPA but, in keeping with
recent legislative trends, reserved to itself a veto power in respect to those
matters which are anticipated to be most contentious and politically sensi-
tive. Thus, congressional review is allowed in two instances. Section 202(c)
of the NGPA allows either the House or the Senate to adopt a resolution of
disapproval with respect to the amending rule which expands the class of
industrial users who will be subject to incremental pricing. In the event of
such congresional disapproval, authority exists for the FERC to resubmit an
amending rule within certain time limitations. Section 206(d)(2) of the
NGPA allows either the House or the Senate to adopt a resolution of disap-
proval with respect to any rule providing for exemption in whole or in part
of a category of industrial users or of a specific facility from incremental
pricing. It remains to be seen whether the exercise of this veto power will
seriously hamper the effective administration of the NGPA by the FERC.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCREMENTAL PRICING
While the theoretical rationale for incremental pricing seems meritori-
ous, the implementations and administrative costs are prohibitive and unjus-
tifiable considering the time frame within which incremental pricing will be
operative. Unless fuel oil prices rise dramatically, it is estimated that in cer-
tain jurisdictions industrial users subject to incremental pricing will have
84. The original House bill provided that an opportunity for oral presentation of views
would be required in addition to observing the procedural requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976). The Senate bill relied on the provisions of the
Natural Gas Act allowing the Commission to establish procedures for its own hearings, investi-
gations, and proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 95-1752 at 116, reprthtedz'n [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 8983, 9033. NGPA § 502(b) specifically excepts from this requirement any rules of
orders made pursuant to the emergency authority granted the FERC in §§ 301-303 inclusive,
but does not contemplate an exercise of discretion on the part of the FERC pursuant to
§ 553(d)(3) of the APA to shorten or totally abrogate the 30 day period between publication
date and effective date provided an opportunity for oral presentation is afforded within 45 days
or 30 days respectively after the effective date.
85. 44 Fed. Reg. 29090 (1979). The final rule, when issued, will be at 18 C.F.R. 282.
86. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Apr. 19, 1979, at 8.
87. NGPA § 502(c).
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little capacity to absorb surcharges before their cost of gas will be equivalent
to a Btu level of fuel oil.88 Certainly, at some point between 1983 and 1985,
by which time most "new gas" prices will have been deregulated, low prior-
ity gas users will probably have converted to an alternate energy source or
will be paying a price for gas equal to its full Btu value.
An alternative solution to incremental pricing would have been to use a
taxing mechanism. Such a program would maintain the wellhead price ceil-
ings and staged deregulation provisions contained in title I of the NGPA to
assure proper incentives for exploration and development of new gas reserves
without causing precipitous inflation. However, the full cost of new gas ac-
quisitions would be rolled in and passed on pro rata to all consumers.
Recognizing that this rolled in price would not reflect the true Btu
value of the gas in relation to fuel oil, at least so long as significant volumes
of "old gas" were available, a tax would be assessed against large industrial
users of gas as boiler fuel based upon volume of gas consumed. The same
criteria and procedures would be adopted for determining who would be
subject to taxation as are set out in the NGPA for deciding who will be
subject to incremental pricing.
The tax rate would be fixed on a monthly basis equal to the difference
between the actual price paid for gas by the low-priority user and the
equivalent Btu cost in that period for a particular grade of fuel oil. For the
sake of simplicity, it would be preferable to establish a uniform standard of
fuel oil, such as No. 2 fuel oil, the delivered cost to be calculated monthly on
a state by state basis. However, if it appeared that in certain regions this
would trigger massive fuel conversion by industrial users or any of the dis-
cussed corresponding problems, variations in the quality of the benchmark
fuel oil could be introduced on a regional basis.
The supplier of the gas to the industrial consumer, whether an interstate
pipeline or local distributing company, would be responsible for assessing
and collecting the tax based on its own delivery records and information
from the state regulatory agency as to the appropriate fuel oil cost for that
month. Some sub-metering would be required where an end-user consumes
gas for both exempt and non-exempt purposes, but otherwise the calculation
of the tax would be reasonably straightforward.
Efficiency and conservation gains would be realized by imposing the
fuel cost of gas consumption on the general populace. If it is perceived that
this results in undue hardship to certain classes, relief could be granted
through the income tax structure on a more progressive basis than the pro-
posed subsidy to all non-incrementally priced consumers. Lost tax revenue
from such allowances would be recovered from the "boiler fuel gas consump-
tion tax."
This proposal would retain key policy objectives of incentive pricing for
increased domestic gas production and of normalizing prices in interstate
and intrastate gas markets. While residential consumers would feel the im-
pact of higher gas prices more rapidly than under the incremental pricing
88. Inside FERC (McGraw-Hill) Mar. 12, 1979, at 7.
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scheme, the increase would be a gradual one in view of the schedule of
staged deregulation. Industrial consumers of gas as boiler fuel would experi-
ence an immediate increased cost equal to the "alternative fuel cost" rather
than an incremental increase up to this level. If empirical research disclosed
that this would precipitate undesirable widespread fuel conversion, the ef-
fects could be modified by using a lower grade fuel oil as the initial taxation
standard with progressive substitutions of increasingly higher quality alter-
native fuels. In any event the net effect would be a more efficient allocation
of resources in respect to both residential/commercial and industrial con-
sumers since both groups would face costs more closely related to the true
heating value of natural gas relative to other fuel sources.
The immediate inflationary effects of this scheme would undoubtedly
be greater than under incremental pricing. Residential consumers would
face higher direct costs of gas consumption and indirect costs of consumer
products as industry internalized the tax into its cost structure. Assuming a
certain price elasticity of demand for natural gas, these effects would be off-
set to some extent as consumers reduced consumption and implemented con-
servation measures.
The most salient advantage of this proposal over incremental pricing
would be the elimination of costly accounting and administrative proce-
dures. Although the taxing scheme also requires implementation and en-
forcement mechanics, it would eliminate the calculation of gas acquisition
costs in excess of the threshold levels for different categories of gas. It would
eliminate the determination of surcharge absorption capability of individual
facilities. It could eliminate much of the rulemaking in respect to alternative
fuel costs, depending upon how finely tuned the tax was to be regulated.
Furthermore, it would eliminate the mechanics of pass-through of costs
among the various carriers in the chain of delivery from producer to end-
user. As gas prices increased, the total tax revenue would decrease and
would eventually be phased out, subject of course to variations in the price
of fuel oil.
IV. CONCLUSION
Incremental pricing lacks political support from virtually all segments.
Interstate pipelines and local distributing companies are antagonistic be-
cause of the administrative burden. Non-exempt industrial gas users foresee
rapidly increasing costs of gas consumption. Even the residential consumer
for whose benefit the scheme is essentially being implemented will continue
to experience rising gas costs and will probably lack an understanding of
how much more severe these increases would be without incremental pric-
ing. Resistance is anticipated from state agencies whose cooperation is vital
in effectively implementing the scheme. All of these factors will aggravate
the problems associated with a complicated piece of legislation such as the
NGPA especially one which relies heavily on voluntary compliance.
In a period when public reaction toward government regulation and
mushrooming bureaucracy is so negative and vociferous, incremental pricing
lacks political credibility. Throughout the lengthy congressional debates
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and extensive economic analyses that preceded the final draft of the NGPA,
more consideration should have been given to how public sentiment could
be reflected in choosing among alternative solutions to the problems of natu-
ral gas pricing. By this criterion alone, the proposal set forth in Part III of
this article would be preferable to the incremental pricing scheme.
